Showing posts with label Indonesia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Indonesia. Show all posts

Monday, November 24, 2008

Presiden terpilih Barrack Obama akan bersikap lebih lunak terhadap kebijakan energi nuklir Iran

President terpilih Barrack Obama akan bersikap lebih lunak terhadap Iran, demikian pendapat beberapa orang ahli politik luar negeri Amerika Serikat, selengkapnya baca:

With Iran, Obama Needs More Carrot, Less Stick


by Scott Ritter
(source: Truthdig)
Sunday, November 16, 2008

The American people have spoken, and the next president of the United States will be Barack Obama. Running on a platform of change, the president-elect will be severely tested early in his administration by a host of challenges, be they economic, military, environmental or diplomatic in nature. How Obama handles these issues will define his tenure as America’s chief executive, and there will not—nor should there be—a honeymoon period. The challenges of these times do not permit such a luxury, something the president-elect had to know and comprehend when he chose to run for office. John McCain and Hillary Clinton, Obama’s defeated rivals, were both correct when they noted that the next president would need to be ready to govern on day one. Barack Obama has until the 20th of January to get his policies in order, because at one minute past noon on that day, he becomes the most powerful man in a volatile world. While the problems he will face are many, I will focus on what I believe are the four most critical issues that will need to be addressed in the first weeks and months of the Obama administration: Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Russia. This will be done in a series of articles, the first of which will deal with Iran.

Barack Obama, the candidate, said many things about Iran, some of which were inherently contradictory. In this he is not unique, since the reality of the rough-and-tumble world of American presidential politics requires any given candidate to show extreme flexibility in defining solutions to complex problems, oftentimes based not on the facts as they exist, but rather the fiction of domestic political imperative. Sometimes initial positions are staked out based upon fact-based analysis, only to be corrected as a given domestic constituency expresses unease and imposes its own fantasy-based worldview on the candidate. Nowhere is this process of the fictionalization of fact more prevalent than on the issue of Iran and its nuclear program. One year ago, in an interview with The New York Times, Obama demonstrated a level-headed approach toward Iran, expressing “serious concern” over the country’s nuclear program and its support for what he termed “terrorist organizations.” He grounded his comments in an appreciation for the cause-and-effect relationship between Iran’s involvement in Iraq and the Bush administration’s invasion and occupation of that country. Obama also expressed the need for “aggressive diplomacy” with Iran at the highest levels and emphasized the importance of economic incentives and security assurances when it came to compelling Iran to change course on its nuclear program.

But many months on the campaign trail, fighting a determined Democratic challenger, Hillary Clinton, and a critical Republican Party, compelled the thoughtful Harvard-educated foreign policy neophyte to buckle under the pressure of needing to be seen as “strong” and “determined” in the face of continued Iranian intransigence. In July of 2008, following a series of Iranian ballistic missile tests, which included the Shahib-3 long-range missile, Obama seemed to retreat from diplomacy, noting aggressively that “Iran is a great threat.” Instead of trying to balance the Iranian decision to test its missiles with ongoing militaristic rhetoric from both the United States and Israel (including a large-scale Israeli air force exercise that simulated a strike on Iran), Obama undertook a single-dimension approach toward the problem and predictably came up with an equally simplistic solution: “We have to make sure we are working with our allies to apply tightened pressure on Iran,” including tighter economic sanctions. Obama noted that there was a “need for us to create a kind of policy that is putting the burden on Iran to change behavior, and frankly we just have not been able to do that over the last several years.” Gone was any notion of understanding the cause-and-effect relationships that may have influenced Iran’s actions, or the notion that wrongheaded American policy (such as continued economic sanctions) may in fact have contributed to Iran’s behavior.

If one was hoping that Obama’s sweeping electoral victory in the 2008 presidential election might have liberated him from the need to assume a “tough guy” pose, the recent press conference given by the president-elect set the record straight. “Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon,” Obama stated, “ … is unacceptable. And we have to mount an international effort to prevent that from happening.” Perhaps Obama received some new insight into Iran from his recent access to top-secret CIA intelligence briefings that prompted him to unilaterally declare as fact the existence of an Iranian program to develop nuclear weapons. There is, of course, no substantive data to sustain such an assertion. As a critic of the U.S. intelligence failure concerning Iraq’s WMD programs in the lead-up to the invasion and occupation of that country, as well as the Bush administration’s politicization of intelligence for ideological motives, Obama would do well to take any intelligence briefing on Iran, void of incontrovertible evidence, with much-warranted skepticism.

selengkapnya baca sumber: http://www.campaigniran.org/casmii/index.php?q=node/6890


Partner strategis antara India dan Iran, mendapat sorotan serius Presiden Bush

Para ahli masalah India asal Amerika menganggap bahwa India mencoba membentuk poros India-Iran dalam masalah kontraversi Energi Nuklir Iran. Pembentukan relasi ini, yang disebut sebagai Tehran-New Delhi Axis, cukup mengkawatirkan para ahli Amerika tentang India dan termasuk juga Presiden Bush, kekawatiran ini dapat dibaca pada artikel dibawah ini:

India-Iran ties: The Myth of a 'Strategic' Partnership

Harsh V. Pant
02/11/2008

Despite all the talk of an emerging “strategic partnership” between India and Iran in Washington’s policy-making circles, two recent developments underscore the tenuous nature of India-Iran ties. Tehran has taken up with the Indian government the issue of India launching an Israeli satellite, TECSAR, that many in Israel have suggested would be used to spy on Iran’s nuclear program. More significant, perhaps, is the Indian decision not to attend the proposed trilateral talks in Tehran later this month for finalizing the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline deal, given the non-resolution of the transit fee issue between India and Pakistan.

Ever since the United States and India started to transform their ties by changing the global nuclear order to accommodate India, Iran has emerged as a litmus test that India has had to pass from time to time to the satisfaction of US policy makers. India’s traditionally close ties with Iran have become a factor influencing a US-India partnership. India-Iran ties have been termed variously as an “axis.” a “strategic partnership,” and even an “alliance.” Some in the US strategic community believe that a “Tehran-New Delhi Axis” has been emerging over the past few years that could be significant for the US because of its potentially damaging impact on US interests in Southwest Asia and the Middle East.

Given the recent obsession of US policy makers with Iran, India has been asked to prove its loyalty by backing Washington on Iran’s nuclear program. The Bush Administration stated that if India voted against the US motion on Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency, the US Congress would likely not approve the US-India nuclear agreement. Congressman Tom Lantos (D-CA) threatened that India “will pay a heavy price for a disregard of US concerns vis-à-vis Iran.” India finally voted in February 2006 to refer Iran to the United Nations' Security Council. This was the second time India voted with the West on the issue. Despite this, many members of Congress continued to demand that the nuclear deal be conditional on New Delhi’s ending all military relations with Tehran.

The Bush Administration insisted that it would oppose any amendment to the nuclear pact that would condition cooperation upon India’s policies towards Iran. However, the US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act (better known as the Hyde Act) of 2006 contains a 'Statement of Policy' section which explicates a few riders ensuring India’s support for US policy toward the Iranian nuclear issue, in particular “to dissuade, isolate, and if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability and the capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction.” While this has generated considerable opposition in India, President Bush emphasized that his Administration would interpret this as merely “advisory” While the Bush Administration itself has expressed concern about India-Iran ties, it has refused to make them central to the nuclear deal.

However, the American focus on India-Iran ties has been highly disproportionate to the realities of this relationship, a result more of the exigencies of domestic politics than of regional political realities.

Interestingly, the Indian Left has also made Iran an issue emblematic of India’s 'strategic autonomy' and has used it to coerce the Indian Government into following an ideological foreign policy. However, a close examination of the India-Iran relationship reveals an underdeveloped relationship.

selengkapnya baca sumbe: http://casi.ssc.upenn.edu/node/130


India dukung Iran dalam pembangunan PLTN untuk Tujuan Damai, kata menteri luar negeri India

Kontraversi pembangunan PLTN Iran terus berlanjut, sangsi ekonomi yang akan diberlakukan terhadap Iran tidak membuat Iran surut, dan mengurungkan niatnya untuk membangun PLTN dengan tujuan damai. Kontraversi ini dipertajam dengan adanya dukungan India terhadap Iran seperti disampaikan oleh menteriluar negerinya Pranab Mukherjee, beritanya dapat dibaca berikut ini:

(2 Nov 2008)
Iran hasevery right to develop nuclear energy: India

NEW DELHI (IRNA) -- India's External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee has emphasized Iran's right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful uses.

“We firmly are of the view that Iran has every right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,” he noted.

In an interview with IRNA ahead of departure to Tehran, Mukherjee explained his opinion about his visit to Tehran for participating in Iran-India joint commission before he left India.

Excerpts of interview:

Q: Your Excellency's visit to Tehran is taking place in a desirable circumstance after the inking of the U.S.-India nuclear deal, the visit is, in fact, an affirmation of the strong relations between Iran and India and a rejection of the rumors that the deal may influence the ties between Tehran and New Delhi. What is your views in this regard?

Pranab: India-Iran relations are important in themselves because of our historic, civilizational as well as contemporary ties. Regular exchange of high level visits has always been characteristic of our relations. This is in fact my third visit in about 20 months and underscores both the importance which India gives to its relations with Iran as also the substantive interests India and Iran have in common.

Q: It seems that the relations between Iran and India have to be evaluated without the prospect of peace pipeline. How do you think about this?

Pranab: India and Iran have a broad based relationship and no single issue defines it in its entirety. Energy security is important for India and Iran as a major hydrocarbon exporting country. The energy aspect of our relationship is therefore also extremely important. Both sides are committed to the Iran-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline Project which is an important part of our much wider relationship on energy related issues.

Q: What percentage of the energy need of India would be met by the U.S.-India nuclear deal? Which are the other plans India is looking for to have access to the secure energy resources?

Pranab: As an energy deficient country we have to use all available sources of energy - Thermal, Hydro, Nuclear, Solar, Wind, etc. Just as the Civil Nuclear Agreement is important from our energy security point of view, similarly, other sources are also important and we will pursue all possible sources to meet our energy requirements so as to ensure that our developmental goals are fully achieved.

baca selengkapnya, sumber : Tehran Times
http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=181375

India punya 15 reaktor ukuran kecil, 2 ukuran sedang, 6 reaktor sedang dibangun

India secara meyakinkan sudah mempunyai 15 reaktor kecil, 2 ukuran sedang (mid-size) dan 6 reaktor lagi sedang dibangun. Semantara Indonesia, negara berpenduduk no 4 dunia, setelah China, India, dan Amerika Serikat masih memperdebatkan untuk membangun atau tidak PLTN. Bahkan undang-undang yang sudah ditetapkan oleh DPR dianggap angin lalu oleh pemerintahan SBY, yang sedang sibuk untuk menghadapi pemilu 2009. Atmosfir yang ditiupkan oleh orang-orang yang sakit hati, dan organisasi green peace yang menjadi lembaga kepentingan pihak-pihak tertentu terus menyuarakan antipatinya. Pihak pro PLTN tetap berdiam diri. Sampai kapankah pro-kontra PLTN berlangsung, sementara India apalagi China masih tetap konsisten dengan rencana energi mereka, tanpa terganggu dengan krisis Ekonomi global. Baca berita berikut

Nuclear Power in India

(October 2008)
  • India has a flourishing and largely indigenous nuclear power program and expects to have 20,000 MWe nuclear capacity on line by 2020. It aims to supply 25% of electricity from nuclear power by 2050.
  • Because India is outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty due to its weapons program, it has been for 34 years largely excluded from trade in nuclear plant or materials, which has hampered its development of civil nuclear energy.
  • Due to these trade bans and lack of indigenous uranium, India has uniquely been developing a nuclear fuel cycle to exploit its reserves of thorium.
  • From 2008, foreign technology and fuel are expected to boost India's nuclear power plans considerably.

Electricity demand in India has been increasing rapidly, and the 534 billion kilowatt hours produced in 2002 was almost double the 1990 output, though still represented only 505 kWh per capita for the year. In 2005, 699 billion kWh gross was produced, but with huge transmission losses this resulted in less than 500 billion kWh consumption. The per capita figure is expected to almost triple by 2020, with 6.3% annual growth. Coal provides 69% of the electricity at present, but reserves are limited.

Nuclear power supplied 15.8 billion kWh (2.5%) of India's electricity in 2007 from 3.7 GWe (of 110 GWe total) capacity and this will increase steadily as imported uranium becomes available and new plants come on line. India's fuel situation, with shortage of fossil fuels, is driving the nuclear investment for electricity, and 25% nuclear contribution is foreseen by 2050, from one hundred times the 2002 capacity. Almost as much investment in the grid system as in power plants is necessary.

In 2006 almost US$ 9 billion was committed for power projects, including 9354 MWe of new generating capacity, taking forward projects to 43.6 GWe and US$ 51 billion.

A KPMG report in 2007 said that India needed to spend US$ 120-150 billion on power infrastructure over the next five years, including transmission and distribution. It said that distribution losses are currently some 30-40%, worth more than $6 billion per year.

The target since about 2004 has been for nuclear power is to provide 20,000 MWe by 2020, but in 2007 the prime Minister referred to this as "modest" and capable of being "doubled with the opening up of international cooperation." However, it is evident that on the basis of indigenous fuel supply only, the 20,000 MWe target is not attainable, or at least not sustainable without uranium imports.

Nuclear power industry development

Nuclear power for civil use is well established in India. Its civil nuclear strategy has been directed towards complete independence in the nuclear fuel cycle, necessary because it is excluded from the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) due to it acquiring nuclear weapons capability after 1970. (Those five countries doing so before 1970 were accorded the status of Nuclear Weapons States under the NPT.)

As a result, India's nuclear power program has proceeded largely without fuel or technological assistance from other countries (but see later section). Its power reactors to the mid 1990s had some of the world's lowest capacity factors, reflecting the technical difficulties of the country's isolation, but rose impressively from 60% in 1995 to 85% in 2001-02.

India's nuclear energy self-sufficiency extended from uranium exploration and mining through fuel fabrication, heavy water production, reactor design and construction, to reprocessing and waste management. It has a small fast breeder reactor and is building a much larger one. It is also developing technology to utilise its abundant resources of thorium as a nuclear fuel.

The Atomic Energy Establishment was set up at Trombay, near Mumbai, in 1957 and renamed as Bhaba Atomic Research Centre (BARC) ten years later. Plans for building the first Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR) were finalised in 1964, and this prototype - Rawatbhata-1, which had Canada's Douglas Point reactor as a reference unit, was built as a collaborative venture between Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd and NPCIL. It started up in 1972 and was duplicated Subsequent indigenous PHWR development has been based on these units.

The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL) is responsible for design, construction, commissioning and operation of thermal nuclear power plants.

It has 15 small and two mid-sized nuclear power reactors in commercial operation, six under construction - including two large ones and a fast breeder reactor, and more planned.

selengkapnya baca: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf53.html