Daftar Lengkap Pembagunan PLTN sejagat, data Agustus 2008

Dibawah ini adalah rencana dan pembangunan Reaktor yang ditujukan untuk Pembangkit Listrik Tenaga Nuklir (PLTN), Indonesia tidak termasuk dalam daftar ini.

Memang PLTN Indonesia masih belum jelas arahnya, pemilu 2009 kelihatannya lebih penting. Juga eksekusi Amrozi yang dilaksanakan pada 911, satu angka yang melambangkan teroris, yaitu ambruknya Trade Center di Amerika.

Kelihatannya tanggal tersebut barangkali merupakan pesan sponsor? Hukuman bagi teroris, di tanggal yang sama aksi teroris dilakukan terhadap Amerika. Semoga hal ini tidak bermakna seperti diatas.

Di suatu tulisan di mailing list indo energi, sempat terbaca tulisan sdr. Dr Iwan Kurniawan, teman saya, penentang PLTN Indonesia no. 1 di Indonesia, yang menghubungkan teroris dengan Indonesia, seperti tulisannya yang dikutip berikut ".... Belum lagi dicurigai mau mengembangkan Bom nuklir, plus tuduhan di Indonesia banyak teroris, apa tidak semakin susah kalau punya PLTN".

Kenapa harus takut dengan tuduhan tersebut, go nuclear Indonesia.

Power reactors under construction, or almost so

Start Operation*		REACTOR	TYPE	MWe (net)
2008	India, NPCIL	Rawatbhata 5	PHWR	202
2008	India, NPCIL	Kaiga 4	PHWR	202
2008	Iran, AEOI	Bushehr 1	PWR	950
2009	India, NPCIL	Kudankulam 1	PWR	950
2009	India, NPCIL	Rawatbhata 6	PHWR	202
2009	Canada, Bruce Power	Bruce A1	PHWR	769
2009	Russia, Energoatom	Volgodonsk 2	PWR	950
2009	Japan, Hokkaido	Tomari 3	PWR	912
2009	China, Taipower	Lungmen 1	ABWR	1300
2009	India, NPCIL	Kudankalam 2	PWR	950
2010	Canada, Bruce Power	Bruce A2	PHWR	769
2010	Korea, KHNP	Shin Kori 1	PWR	1000
2010	India, NPCIL	Kalpakkam	FBR	470
2010	China, CGNPC	Lingao 3	PWR	1080
2010	China, Taipower	Lungmen 2	ABWR	1300
2010	Argentina, CNEA	Atucha 2	PHWR	692
2010	Russia, Energoatom	Severodvinsk	PWR x 2	70
2011	Finland, TVO	Olkilouto 3	PWR	1600
2011	Russia, Energoatom	Kalinin 4	PWR	950
2011	Korea, KHNP	Shin Kori 2	PWR	1000
2011	China, CNNC	Qinshan 6	PWR	650
2011	China, CGNPC	Lingao 4	PWR	1080
2011	Pakistan, PAEC	Chashma 2	PWR	300
2011	Russia, Energoatom	Kursk 5	RBMK	1000
2012	China, CNNC	Qinshan 7	PWR	650
2012	Korea, KHNP	Shin Wolsong 1	PWR	1000
2012	France, EdF	Flamanville 3	PWR	1630
2012	Russia, Energoatom	Beloyarsk 4	FBR	750
2012	Japan, Chugoku	Shimane 3	PWR	1375
2012	Russia, Energoatom	Novovoronezh 6	PWR	1070
2012	Slovakia, SE	Mochovce 3	PWR	440
2012	China, CGNPC	Hongyanhe 1	PWR	1080
2012	China, CGNPC	Ningde 1	PWR	1080
2013	China, CNNC	Sanmen 1	PWR	1100
2013	China, CGNPC	Ningde 2	PWR	1080
2013	Krea, KHNP	Shin Wolsong 2	PWR	1000
2013	Russia, Energoatom	Leningrad 5	PWR	1070
2013	Russia, Energoatom	Novovoronezh 7	PWR	1070
2013	Russia, Energoatom	Rostov/ Volgodonsk 3	PWR	1070
2013	Korea, KHNP	Shin Kori 3	PWR	1350
2013	China, CGNPC	Hongyanhe 2	PWR	1080
2013	China, CGNPC	Yangjiang 1	PWR	1080
2013	China, CGNPC	Taishan 1	PWR	1700
2013	China, Huaneng	Shidaowan	HTR	200
2013	China, CNNC	Fangjiashan 1	PWR	1000
2013	Japan, EPDC/J Power	Ohma	ABWR	1350
2013	Japan, Tepco	Fukishima I-6	ABWR	1350
2013	Slovakia, SE	Mochovce 4	PWR	440
2014	China , CNNC	Sanmen 2	PWR	1100
2014	China , CPI	Haiyang 1	PWR	1100
2014	China , CGNPC	Ningde 3	PWR	1080
2014	China , CGNPC	Yangjiang 2	PWR	1080
2014	China , CGNPC	Hongyanhe 3	PWR	1080
2014	China, CNNC	Fangjiashan 2	PWR	1000
2014	Korea, KHNP	Shin-Kori 4	PWR	1350
2014	Romania, SNN	Cernavoda 3	PHWR	655
2014	Bulgaria, NEK	Belene 1	PWR	1000
2014	Russia , Energoatom	Leningrad 6	PWR	1200
2014	Russia , Energoatom	Rostov/ Volgodonsk 4	PWR	1200
2014	Japan , Tepco	Fukishima I-7	ABWR	1080
2015	Japan , Tepco	Higashidori 1	ABWR	1080

* Latest announced year of proposed commercial operation.
† grid connected.

The World Nuclear Power Reactor table gives a fuller and (for current year) possibly more up to date overview of world reactor status.

Some further power reactors planned or on order

Start operation	Start construction		Reactor	Type	MWe (each)
2015	2008	Bulgaria, NEK	Belene 2	PWR	1000
2016	2010	Japan, Tepco	Higashidori 2 (Tepco)	ABWR	1320
2013-14	2010	Japan, JAPC	Tsuruga 3 & 4	APWR	1500
2014/16	2009	Japan, Chugoku	Kaminoseki 1	ABWR	1373
2016-17		Korea, KHNP	Shin-Ulchin 1-2	APR-1400	1350
2014	2011	Japan, Tohoku	Higashidori 2 (Tohoku)	ABWR	1320
2015		Slovenia, NEK	Krsko 2	PWR?	1000?

Dates according to latest announcements.

sumber: http://www.world-nuclear.com/info/inf17.html

Rencana Pembangunan Reaktor Sejagad, data Agustus 2008

Rencana pembangunan reaktor untuk tujjuan damai (PLTN) diseluruh penjuru dunia meningkat dengan tajam. Hal ini sejalan dengan pertumbuhan ekonomi dunia, dimana setiap negara membutuhkan lebih banyak energi untuk kehidupan industri dan penduduknya.
Sementara Indonesia, yang lebih dulu merencanakan PLTN, belum membangun satupun PLTN. Indonesia sibuk menggali batubara(coal), yang jelas-jelas merusak lingkungan. Sementara USA yang mempunyai cadangan Coal lebih banyak, tidak melakukan hal yang sama dengan Indonesia.
Sekarang George Soros, dikabarkan membeli saham BUMI di market, dan siap mengakuisisi BUMI,perusahaan yang mengangkat Aburizal Bakri menjadi orang terkaya di Indonesia versi Forbes 2008.
Berikut adalah peta pembangunan PLTN oleh negara-negara dunia, Indonesia belum termasuk didalamnya, kita masih sibuk berdebat dan menghabiskan energi dalam perdebatan tersebut. Karena semuanya yang menentukan adalah Presiden, bukan masyarakat. Dimanapun di dunia ini, pembangunan PLTN pasti mendapat perlawanan oleh sebagian masyarakat. Lihat berita dibawah ini


Plans For New Reactors Worldwide

(August 2008)

• Nuclear power capacity worldwide is increasing steadily but not dramatically, with about 35 reactors under construction in 12 countries.
• Most reactors on order or planned are in the Asian region, though plans are firming for new units in Europe, the USA and Russia.
• Significant further capacity is being created by plant upgrading.
• Plant life extension programs are maintaining capacity, in USA particularly.

Today there are some 439 nuclear power reactors operating in 30 countries plus Taiwan, with a combined capacity of about 370 GWe. In 2007 these provided 2608 billion kWh, about 16% of the world's electricity.

About 35 power reactors are currently being constructed in 11 countries (see Table below), notably China, South Korea, Japan and Russia.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has significantly increased its projection of world nuclear generating capacity. It now anticipates at least 60 new plants in the next 15 years, making 450 to 690 GWe in place in 2030 - very much more than projected in 2000 and 21% to 85% more than actually operating in 2008. The change is based on specific plans and actions in a number of countries, including China, India, Russia, Finland and France, coupled with the changed outlook due to the Kyoto Protocol. This would give nuclear power a 17% share in electricity production in 2020. The fastest growth is in Asia.

It is noteworthy that in the 1980s, 218 power reactors started up, an average of one every 17 days. These included 47 in USA, 42 in France and 18 in Japan. The average power was 923.5 MWe. So it is not hard to imagine a similar number being commissioned in a decade after about 2015. But with China and India getting up to speed with nuclear energy and a world energy demand double the 1980 level in 2015, a realistic estimate of what is possible might be the equivalent of one 1000 MWe unit worldwide every 5 days.

See also Nuclear Renaissance paper for the factors driving the increase in nuclear power capacity.

Increased Capacity

Increased nuclear capacity in some countries is resulting from the uprating of existing plants. This is a highly cost-effective way of bringing on new capacity.

Numerous power reactors in USA, Belgium, Sweden and Germany, for example, have had their generating capacity increased. In Switzerland, the capacity of its five reactors has been increased by 12.3%. In the USA, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has approved 124 uprates totalling some 5600 MWe since 1977, a few of them "extended uprates" of up to 20%.

Spain has a program to add 810 MWe (11%) to its nuclear capacity through upgrading its nine reactors by up to 13%. For instance, the Almarez nuclear plant is being boosted by more than 5% at a cost of US$ 50 million. Some 519 MWe of the increase is already in place.

Finland Finland has boosted the capacity of the Olkiluoto plant by 29% to 1700 MWe. This plant started with two 660 MWe Swedish BWRs commissioned in 1978 and 1980. It is now licensed to operate to 2018. The Loviisa plant, with two VVER-440 (PWR) reactors, has been uprated by 90 MWe (10%).

Sweden is uprating Forsmark plant by 13% (410 MWe) over 2008-10 at a cost of EUR 225 million, and Oskarshamn-3 by 21% to 1450 MWe at a cost of EUR 180 million.

Nuclear Plant Construction

Most reactors currently planned are in the Asian region, with fast-growing economies and rapidly-rising electricity demand.

Some 16 countries with existing nuclear power programs (Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, France, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Japan, Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, South Africa, Ukraine, USA) have plans to build new power reactors (beyond those now under construction).

In all, over 90 power reactors with a total net capacity of almost 100,000 MWe are planned and over 200 more are proposed. Rising gas prices and greenhouse constraints on coal have combined to put nuclear power back on the agenda for projected new capacity in both Europe and North America.

In the USA there are proposals for over twenty new reactors and the first combined construction and operating licences for these have been applied for. All are for late third-generation plants, and a further proposal is for two ABWR units.

In Canada there are plans to build up to 3500 MWe of new capacity in Ontario, and proposals for similar capacity in Alberta and one large reactor in New Brunswick.

In Finland, construction is now under way on a fifth, very large reactor which will come on line in 2011 and plans a re firming for another large one to follow it.

France is building a similar 1600 MWe unit at Flamanville, for operation from 2012, and a second is to follow it.

Romania's second power reactor istarted up in 2007, and plans are being finalised for two further Canadian units.

Slovakia is completing two 470 MWe units at Mochovce, to operate from 2011-12.

Bulgaria is about to start building two 1000 MWe Russian reactors at Belene.

In Russia, five large reactors are under active construction and due for completion by 2012, one being a large fast neutron reactor. Seven further reactors are then planned to replace some existing plants, and by 2015 ten new reactors totalling at least 9.8 GWe should be operating. Further reactors are planned to add new capacity by 2020. This will increase the country's present 21.7 GWe nuclear power capacity to 50 GWe about 2020. In addition about 5 GW of nuclear thermal capacity is planned. A small floating power plant is expected to be completed by 2011 and another by 2020.

Poland is planning some nuclear power capacity but initially is likely to join a joint project in Lithuania, with Estonia and Latvia.

Nuclear power will continue to play a major role in the future electricity supply mix in both South Korea and Japan.

South Korea plans to bring a further eight reactors into operation by the year 2015, giving total new capacity of 9200 MWe. Ulchin 5 & 6 were connected to the grid in 2004. Following them are planned Shin-Kori-1 & 2 and Wolsong-5 & 6, to be improved OPR-1000 designs. Then come Shin-Kori-3 & 4 and Shin-Ulchin 1&2, the first of the Advanced PWRs of 1400 MWe, to be in operation by 2016. These APR-1400 designs have evolved from a US design which has US NRC design certification, and have been known as the Korean Next-Generation Reactor.

Japan has two reactors under construction and another ready to start building. It also has plans and, in most cases, designated sites and announced timetables for a further 10 power reactors, totalling over 13,000 MWe which are expected to come on line 2012-18.

In China, now with eleven operating reactors on the mainland, CNNC is well into the next phase of its nuclear power program. The second of two Russian 1000 MWe PWRs at Tianwan in Jiangsu province was grid connected in May 2007.

China NNC and Guangdong NPC have six more indigenous reactors under construction at Lingdong, Qinshan, Hongyanhe and Ningde. Ten more are due to start construction by July 2010 at these sites plus Yangjiang. Four large Western third-generation ones are due to start construction at Sanmen and Haiyang, with two more at Taishan. China aims to quadruple its nuclear capacity from that operating and under construction by 2020. The Shidaowan high temperature gas-cooled reactor will start construction in 2009 at Rongcheng , Shandong province.

On Taiwan, Taipower is building two advanced BWRs at Lungmen.

India has six reactors under construction and expected to be completed by 2010. This includes two large Russian reactors and a large prototype fast breeder reactor as part of its strategy to develop a fuel cycle which can utilise thorium. Further units are planned.

Pakistan has a second 300 MWe reactor under construction at Chasma, financed by China. There are plans for more Chinese power reactors.

In Kazakhstan, a joint venture with Russia's Atomstroyexport envisages development and marketing of innovative small and medium-sized reactors, starting with a 300 MWe Russian design as baseline for Kazakh units.

In Iran nuclear power plant construction was suspended in 1979 but in 1995 Iran signed an agreement with Russia to complete a 1000 MWe PWR at Bushehr. Construction is well advanced.

The Turkish government plans to have three nuclear power plants total 4500 MWe operating by 2012-15, a US$ 10.5 billion investment.

Indonesia plans to start constructing a 2000 MWe nuclear power station in 2010.

Vietnam is also considering its first nuclear power venture, to be commissioned by 2017.

Fuller details of all the above contries curently without nuclear power are in country papers or the paper on Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries.

Plant Life Extension

Most nuclear power plants originally had a nominal design lifetime of up to 40 years, but engineering assessments of many plants over the last decade has established that many can operate longer. In the USA nearly 50 reactors have been granted licence renewals which extend their operating lives from the original 40 out to 60 years, and operators of most others are expected to apply for similar extensions. In Japan, plant lifetimes up to 70 years re envisaged.

When the oldest commercial nuclear power stations in the world, Calder Hall and Chapelcross in the UK, were built in the 1950s they were very conservatively engineered, though it was assumed that they would have a useful lifetime of only 20-25 years. They were then authorised to operate for 50 years but due to economic factors closed earlier. Most other Magnox plants are licensed for 40-year lifetimes.

The Russian government in 2000 extended the operating lives of the country's 12 oldest reactors from their original 30 years, for 15 years.

The technical and economic feasibility of replacing major reactor components, such as steam generators in PWRs and pressure tubes in CANDU heavy water reactors, has been demonstrated. The possibilities of component replacement and licence renewals extending the lifetimes of existing plants are very attractive to utilities, especially in view of the public acceptance difficulties involved in constructing replacement nuclear capacity.

On the other hand, economic, regulatory and political considerations have led to the premature closure of some power reactors, particularly in the United States, where reactor numbers have fell from 110 to 104, and in eastern Europe.

sumber: http://www.world-nuclear.com/info/inf17.html

Text Lengkap tentang NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Naskah lengkap tentang NPT, serta siapa saja yang menandatangani kesepakatan tersebut disebutkan pada naskah lengkap ini:

THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
( NPT )

(text of the treaty)

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty,

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.1

Article XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.

Presiden terpilih Barrack Obama akan bersikap lebih lunak terhadap kebijakan energi nuklir Iran

President terpilih Barrack Obama akan bersikap lebih lunak terhadap Iran, demikian pendapat beberapa orang ahli politik luar negeri Amerika Serikat, selengkapnya baca:

With Iran, Obama Needs More Carrot, Less Stick

by Scott Ritter (source: Truthdig)

Sunday, November 16, 2008

The American people have spoken, and the next president of the United States will be Barack Obama. Running on a platform of change, the president-elect will be severely tested early in his administration by a host of challenges, be they economic, military, environmental or diplomatic in nature. How Obama handles these issues will define his tenure as America’s chief executive, and there will not—nor should there be—a honeymoon period. The challenges of these times do not permit such a luxury, something the president-elect had to know and comprehend when he chose to run for office. John McCain and Hillary Clinton, Obama’s defeated rivals, were both correct when they noted that the next president would need to be ready to govern on day one. Barack Obama has until the 20th of January to get his policies in order, because at one minute past noon on that day, he becomes the most powerful man in a volatile world. While the problems he will face are many, I will focus on what I believe are the four most critical issues that will need to be addressed in the first weeks and months of the Obama administration: Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Russia. This will be done in a series of articles, the first of which will deal with Iran.

Barack Obama, the candidate, said many things about Iran, some of which were inherently contradictory. In this he is not unique, since the reality of the rough-and-tumble world of American presidential politics requires any given candidate to show extreme flexibility in defining solutions to complex problems, oftentimes based not on the facts as they exist, but rather the fiction of domestic political imperative. Sometimes initial positions are staked out based upon fact-based analysis, only to be corrected as a given domestic constituency expresses unease and imposes its own fantasy-based worldview on the candidate. Nowhere is this process of the fictionalization of fact more prevalent than on the issue of Iran and its nuclear program. One year ago, in an interview with The New York Times, Obama demonstrated a level-headed approach toward Iran, expressing “serious concern” over the country’s nuclear program and its support for what he termed “terrorist organizations.” He grounded his comments in an appreciation for the cause-and-effect relationship between Iran’s involvement in Iraq and the Bush administration’s invasion and occupation of that country. Obama also expressed the need for “aggressive diplomacy” with Iran at the highest levels and emphasized the importance of economic incentives and security assurances when it came to compelling Iran to change course on its nuclear program.

But many months on the campaign trail, fighting a determined Democratic challenger, Hillary Clinton, and a critical Republican Party, compelled the thoughtful Harvard-educated foreign policy neophyte to buckle under the pressure of needing to be seen as “strong” and “determined” in the face of continued Iranian intransigence. In July of 2008, following a series of Iranian ballistic missile tests, which included the Shahib-3 long-range missile, Obama seemed to retreat from diplomacy, noting aggressively that “Iran is a great threat.” Instead of trying to balance the Iranian decision to test its missiles with ongoing militaristic rhetoric from both the United States and Israel (including a large-scale Israeli air force exercise that simulated a strike on Iran), Obama undertook a single-dimension approach toward the problem and predictably came up with an equally simplistic solution: “We have to make sure we are working with our allies to apply tightened pressure on Iran,” including tighter economic sanctions. Obama noted that there was a “need for us to create a kind of policy that is putting the burden on Iran to change behavior, and frankly we just have not been able to do that over the last several years.” Gone was any notion of understanding the cause-and-effect relationships that may have influenced Iran’s actions, or the notion that wrongheaded American policy (such as continued economic sanctions) may in fact have contributed to Iran’s behavior.

If one was hoping that Obama’s sweeping electoral victory in the 2008 presidential election might have liberated him from the need to assume a “tough guy” pose, the recent press conference given by the president-elect set the record straight. “Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon,” Obama stated, “ … is unacceptable. And we have to mount an international effort to prevent that from happening.” Perhaps Obama received some new insight into Iran from his recent access to top-secret CIA intelligence briefings that prompted him to unilaterally declare as fact the existence of an Iranian program to develop nuclear weapons. There is, of course, no substantive data to sustain such an assertion. As a critic of the U.S. intelligence failure concerning Iraq’s WMD programs in the lead-up to the invasion and occupation of that country, as well as the Bush administration’s politicization of intelligence for ideological motives, Obama would do well to take any intelligence briefing on Iran, void of incontrovertible evidence, with much-warranted skepticism.

selengkapnya baca sumber: http://www.campaigniran.org/casmii/index.php?q=node/6890

Partner strategis antara India dan Iran, mendapat sorotan serius Presiden Bush

Para ahli masalah India asal Amerika menganggap bahwa India mencoba membentuk poros India-Iran dalam masalah kontraversi Energi Nuklir Iran. Pembentukan relasi ini, yang disebut sebagai Tehran-New Delhi Axis, cukup mengkawatirkan para ahli Amerika tentang India dan termasuk juga Presiden Bush, kekawatiran ini dapat dibaca pada artikel dibawah ini:

India-Iran ties: The Myth of a 'Strategic' Partnership

Harsh V. Pant

02/11/2008

Despite all the talk of an emerging “strategic partnership” between India and Iran in Washington’s policy-making circles, two recent developments underscore the tenuous nature of India-Iran ties. Tehran has taken up with the Indian government the issue of India launching an Israeli satellite, TECSAR, that many in Israel have suggested would be used to spy on Iran’s nuclear program. More significant, perhaps, is the Indian decision not to attend the proposed trilateral talks in Tehran later this month for finalizing the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline deal, given the non-resolution of the transit fee issue between India and Pakistan.

Ever since the United States and India started to transform their ties by changing the global nuclear order to accommodate India, Iran has emerged as a litmus test that India has had to pass from time to time to the satisfaction of US policy makers. India’s traditionally close ties with Iran have become a factor influencing a US-India partnership. India-Iran ties have been termed variously as an “axis.” a “strategic partnership,” and even an “alliance.” Some in the US strategic community believe that a “Tehran-New Delhi Axis” has been emerging over the past few years that could be significant for the US because of its potentially damaging impact on US interests in Southwest Asia and the Middle East.

Given the recent obsession of US policy makers with Iran, India has been asked to prove its loyalty by backing Washington on Iran’s nuclear program. The Bush Administration stated that if India voted against the US motion on Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency, the US Congress would likely not approve the US-India nuclear agreement. Congressman Tom Lantos (D-CA) threatened that India “will pay a heavy price for a disregard of US concerns vis-à-vis Iran.” India finally voted in February 2006 to refer Iran to the United Nations' Security Council. This was the second time India voted with the West on the issue. Despite this, many members of Congress continued to demand that the nuclear deal be conditional on New Delhi’s ending all military relations with Tehran.

The Bush Administration insisted that it would oppose any amendment to the nuclear pact that would condition cooperation upon India’s policies towards Iran. However, the US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act (better known as the Hyde Act) of 2006 contains a 'Statement of Policy' section which explicates a few riders ensuring India’s support for US policy toward the Iranian nuclear issue, in particular “to dissuade, isolate, and if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability and the capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction.” While this has generated considerable opposition in India, President Bush emphasized that his Administration would interpret this as merely “advisory” While the Bush Administration itself has expressed concern about India-Iran ties, it has refused to make them central to the nuclear deal.

However, the American focus on India-Iran ties has been highly disproportionate to the realities of this relationship, a result more of the exigencies of domestic politics than of regional political realities.

Interestingly, the Indian Left has also made Iran an issue emblematic of India’s 'strategic autonomy' and has used it to coerce the Indian Government into following an ideological foreign policy. However, a close examination of the India-Iran relationship reveals an underdeveloped relationship.

selengkapnya baca sumbe: http://casi.ssc.upenn.edu/node/130

India dukung Iran dalam pembangunan PLTN untuk Tujuan Damai, kata menteri luar negeri India

Kontraversi pembangunan PLTN Iran terus berlanjut, sangsi ekonomi yang akan diberlakukan terhadap Iran tidak membuat Iran surut, dan mengurungkan niatnya untuk membangun PLTN dengan tujuan damai. Kontraversi ini dipertajam dengan adanya dukungan India terhadap Iran seperti disampaikan oleh menteriluar negerinya Pranab Mukherjee, beritanya dapat dibaca berikut ini:

(2 Nov 2008)
Iran hasevery right to develop nuclear energy: India

NEW DELHI (IRNA) -- India's External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee has emphasized Iran's right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful uses.

“We firmly are of the view that Iran has every right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,” he noted.

In an interview with IRNA ahead of departure to Tehran, Mukherjee explained his opinion about his visit to Tehran for participating in Iran-India joint commission before he left India.

Excerpts of interview:

Q: Your Excellency's visit to Tehran is taking place in a desirable circumstance after the inking of the U.S.-India nuclear deal, the visit is, in fact, an affirmation of the strong relations between Iran and India and a rejection of the rumors that the deal may influence the ties between Tehran and New Delhi. What is your views in this regard?

Pranab: India-Iran relations are important in themselves because of our historic, civilizational as well as contemporary ties. Regular exchange of high level visits has always been characteristic of our relations. This is in fact my third visit in about 20 months and underscores both the importance which India gives to its relations with Iran as also the substantive interests India and Iran have in common.

Q: It seems that the relations between Iran and India have to be evaluated without the prospect of peace pipeline. How do you think about this?

Pranab: India and Iran have a broad based relationship and no single issue defines it in its entirety. Energy security is important for India and Iran as a major hydrocarbon exporting country. The energy aspect of our relationship is therefore also extremely important. Both sides are committed to the Iran-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline Project which is an important part of our much wider relationship on energy related issues.

Q: What percentage of the energy need of India would be met by the U.S.-India nuclear deal? Which are the other plans India is looking for to have access to the secure energy resources?

Pranab: As an energy deficient country we have to use all available sources of energy - Thermal, Hydro, Nuclear, Solar, Wind, etc. Just as the Civil Nuclear Agreement is important from our energy security point of view, similarly, other sources are also important and we will pursue all possible sources to meet our energy requirements so as to ensure that our developmental goals are fully achieved.

baca selengkapnya, sumber : Tehran Times
http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=181375

India punya 15 reaktor ukuran kecil, 2 ukuran sedang, 6 reaktor sedang dibangun

India secara meyakinkan sudah mempunyai 15 reaktor kecil, 2 ukuran sedang (mid-size) dan 6 reaktor lagi sedang dibangun. Semantara Indonesia, negara berpenduduk no 4 dunia, setelah China, India, dan Amerika Serikat masih memperdebatkan untuk membangun atau tidak PLTN. Bahkan undang-undang yang sudah ditetapkan oleh DPR dianggap angin lalu oleh pemerintahan SBY, yang sedang sibuk untuk menghadapi pemilu 2009. Atmosfir yang ditiupkan oleh orang-orang yang sakit hati, dan organisasi green peace yang menjadi lembaga kepentingan pihak-pihak tertentu terus menyuarakan antipatinya. Pihak pro PLTN tetap berdiam diri. Sampai kapankah pro-kontra PLTN berlangsung, sementara India apalagi China masih tetap konsisten dengan rencana energi mereka, tanpa terganggu dengan krisis Ekonomi global. Baca berita berikut

Nuclear Power in India

(October 2008)

• India has a flourishing and largely indigenous nuclear power program and expects to have 20,000 MWe nuclear capacity on line by 2020. It aims to supply 25% of electricity from nuclear power by 2050.
• Because India is outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty due to its weapons program, it has been for 34 years largely excluded from trade in nuclear plant or materials, which has hampered its development of civil nuclear energy.
• Due to these trade bans and lack of indigenous uranium, India has uniquely been developing a nuclear fuel cycle to exploit its reserves of thorium.
• From 2008, foreign technology and fuel are expected to boost India's nuclear power plans considerably.

Electricity demand in India has been increasing rapidly, and the 534 billion kilowatt hours produced in 2002 was almost double the 1990 output, though still represented only 505 kWh per capita for the year. In 2005, 699 billion kWh gross was produced, but with huge transmission losses this resulted in less than 500 billion kWh consumption. The per capita figure is expected to almost triple by 2020, with 6.3% annual growth. Coal provides 69% of the electricity at present, but reserves are limited.

Nuclear power supplied 15.8 billion kWh (2.5%) of India's electricity in 2007 from 3.7 GWe (of 110 GWe total) capacity and this will increase steadily as imported uranium becomes available and new plants come on line. India's fuel situation, with shortage of fossil fuels, is driving the nuclear investment for electricity, and 25% nuclear contribution is foreseen by 2050, from one hundred times the 2002 capacity. Almost as much investment in the grid system as in power plants is necessary.

In 2006 almost US$ 9 billion was committed for power projects, including 9354 MWe of new generating capacity, taking forward projects to 43.6 GWe and US$ 51 billion.

A KPMG report in 2007 said that India needed to spend US$ 120-150 billion on power infrastructure over the next five years, including transmission and distribution. It said that distribution losses are currently some 30-40%, worth more than $6 billion per year.

The target since about 2004 has been for nuclear power is to provide 20,000 MWe by 2020, but in 2007 the prime Minister referred to this as "modest" and capable of being "doubled with the opening up of international cooperation." However, it is evident that on the basis of indigenous fuel supply only, the 20,000 MWe target is not attainable, or at least not sustainable without uranium imports.

Nuclear power industry development

Nuclear power for civil use is well established in India. Its civil nuclear strategy has been directed towards complete independence in the nuclear fuel cycle, necessary because it is excluded from the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) due to it acquiring nuclear weapons capability after 1970. (Those five countries doing so before 1970 were accorded the status of Nuclear Weapons States under the NPT.)

As a result, India's nuclear power program has proceeded largely without fuel or technological assistance from other countries (but see later section). Its power reactors to the mid 1990s had some of the world's lowest capacity factors, reflecting the technical difficulties of the country's isolation, but rose impressively from 60% in 1995 to 85% in 2001-02.

India's nuclear energy self-sufficiency extended from uranium exploration and mining through fuel fabrication, heavy water production, reactor design and construction, to reprocessing and waste management. It has a small fast breeder reactor and is building a much larger one. It is also developing technology to utilise its abundant resources of thorium as a nuclear fuel.

The Atomic Energy Establishment was set up at Trombay, near Mumbai, in 1957 and renamed as Bhaba Atomic Research Centre (BARC) ten years later. Plans for building the first Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR) were finalised in 1964, and this prototype - Rawatbhata-1, which had Canada's Douglas Point reactor as a reference unit, was built as a collaborative venture between Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd and NPCIL. It started up in 1972 and was duplicated Subsequent indigenous PHWR development has been based on these units.

The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL) is responsible for design, construction, commissioning and operation of thermal nuclear power plants.

It has 15 small and two mid-sized nuclear power reactors in commercial operation, six under construction - including two large ones and a fast breeder reactor, and more planned.

selengkapnya baca: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf53.html